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Using a Fully Automated Set-up, has been published in the proceedings of the 40th 
Electrical Overstress/Electrostatic Discharge Symposium (EOS/ESD), September 2018. 
Paper III, found on pages 55–70, Latch-up Detection During ESD Soft Failure 
Characterization Using an On-Die Power Sensor, has been published in IEEE Letters on 







This research covers the topic of developing a systematic methodology of 
studying electrostatic discharge (ESD)-induced soft failures. ESD-induced soft failures 
(SF) are non-destructive disruptions of the functionality of an electronic system. The soft 
failure robustness of a USB3 Gen 1 interface is investigated, modeled, and improved. The 
injection is performed directly using transmission line pulser (TLP) with varying: pulse 
width, amplitude, polarity. Characterization provides data for failure thresholds and a 
SPICE circuit model that describes the transient voltage and current at the victim. Using 
the injected current, the likelihood of a SF is predicted. ESD protection by transient 
voltage suppressor (TVS) diodes is numerically simulated in several configurations. The 
results strongly suggest the viability of using well-established hard failure mitigation 
techniques for improving SF robustness, and the possibility of using numerical simulation 
for optimization purposes. A concept of soft failure system efficient ESD design (SF-
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In paper I, a system-efficient ESD design methodology is developed for soft 
failures (SF) and applied to USB3 Gen 1 interface. The aim is to create a systematic 
approach of interface characterization, modeling and evaluating effectiveness of 
protection schemes. SF is studied extensively [1]-[10], but most of the studies are either 
purically empirical, or performed on extremely simplified devices (such as D flip-flop, 
etc.) in order to establish the root cause. Often, the root cause of a soft failure lies in noise 
and glitches on power rails as a result of direct or indirect ESD. In practice, the device 
under test (DUT) is very complex and it is either impractical or too expensive to study 
and model each interface at a high level of detail (i.e. individual registers and voltages) 
before being able to propose, test and release a design version robust to soft failures. 
The process of system efficient ESD design (SEED) consists of two major parts. 
First, the desired interface is stressed with a transmission line pulser (TLP), its behavior 
observed and a measurement-based victim pin model is created. Then the pin model is 
combined with models of other parts that are relevant to ESD robustness: transmission 
lines, discrete components, interconnects, etc. Design changes are tested within the model 
in terms of stress at the victim pin, then compared to the damage thresholds. Common 
protection schemes include adding discrete components that are placed at different 
locations within the net under test. The damage thresholds of the victim are evaluated 
earlier experimentally or provided by device vendor. The process continues until the 




There are many discussions of SEED concept for soft failures [4] [6], but no 
implementation or validation could be presented. This work aims to demonstrate that 
such concept is viable and to validate it by testing and modeling a range of commonly 
used hard failure mitigation techniques. 
Paper II shows the development of the systematic testing methodology of a 
complex DUT, which is the first step in the SEED process. Dependency of soft failure 
modes on pulse length and system state is established and 8 different failure modes are 
identified. An automated algorithm is developed and presented in detail. 
Paper III shows a novel method for detecting of latch-ups in power domain by 
using on-die power sensors, without additional measuring instruments. Persistent power 
drain is one of the more pernicious threats to a mobile, battery-powered systems. This 
kind of failure is often not visually or audibly detectable, except in cases of obvious 
heating of the system. This means, it is likely to go undetected by the operator, until the 
battery is drained. The method of detection is shown to be effective and practical. One of 
the appeals is that these power sensors are often implemented as a part of CPU cooling 
and thermal control system, so little additional design effort is required.  
First part of paper I is devoted to using results of papers II and III and proposing 
an empirical circuit model of the victim pin. The latter parts show the implementation of 
the SEED methodology as applied to the soft failure modes, correlation of the circuit 
model to the measurements, and comparison of commonly used ESD mitigation 
techniques. The results provide evidence for viability of the proposed methodology and 






I. IC PIN MODELING AND MITIGATION OF ESD-INDUCED SOFT 
FAILURES 
Giorgi Maghlakelidze 
Deparment of Eletrical and Computer Engineering, Missouri University of Science and 
Technology, Rolla, MO 65409 
ABSTRACT 
ESD-induced soft failures (SF) of a USB3 Gen1 device are investigated by direct 
TLP injection with varying pulse width, amplitude, and polarity. This allows to 
characterize the failure behavior of the interface and to create a SPICE model of the 
voltage and current waveform dependent failure thresholds. ESD protection by TVS 
diodes is numerically simulated in several configurations. The results show viability of 
using well-established hard failure mitigation techniques for improving SF robustness. A 
good agreement between numerical simulation for optimized board design and 
measurements are achieved. A novel concept of Soft Failure System Efficient ESD 
Design (SF-SEED) is proposed and demonstrated to be effective for making decisions for 








1. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
 
Electrostatic discharge-induced soft failures (SF) have been a subject of extensive 
investigations [1]-[10]. Many studies concentrate on empirically characterizing complex 
systems [1], some on studying simpler devices such as 16-bit microcontroller [2] units or 
simpler flip-flop structures and modeling them in detail with full-wave and circuit solvers 
[3] in order to understand the root cause of specific failures. Sophisticated 
characterization techniques are required in order to study each interface of a complex 
interface, such as USB3 SuperSpeed [4][6][7][8]. Often, the root cause of such a failure 
lies in noise and glitches on power rails as a result of direct or indirect ESD [3][4][5]. In 
most practical situations, however, the system is very complex and it is either impractical 
or too expensive to study and model each interface at a high level of detail (i.e. individual 
registers and voltages) before being able to propose, test and release a more robust 
solution.  
System-efficient ESD Design (SEED) is a well-established concept in the industry 
[9][10]. It stands for the design optimization methodology that maximizes robustness of 
signal lines to ESD-induced hard failures (damage) by simulating the high current 
behavior of PCB components. Typically, a measurement-based victim pin model is 
created, then combined with other parts that affect ESD robustness: transmission lines, 
discrete components, interconnects, etc. Design changes are made in the model and 
evaluated in terms of stress at the victim pin, compared to the damage thresholds. 
Common protection schemes include adding discrete components (e.g. TVS diodes, CM 




damage thresholds of the victim are evaluated earlier experimentally or provided by 
device vendor. The process continues until the maximized robustness levels are achieved 
in simulation, then implemented in practice. 
To date, there has been discussion of SEED concept for soft failures [4] [6], but 
no implementation or validation could be presented. This work aims to demonstrate that 
such concept is viable and to validate it by testing and modeling a range of commonly 
used hard failure mitigation techniques.  
The methodology is applied to SuperSpeed lanes of a USB3 Gen 1 interface. A 
directional injection concept is developed for the high-speed interface and used to 
characterize the RX pins of the device under test. An automated test system is used to 
characterize the victim pin and classify the failure modes related to the interface. The 
characterization results are presented as soft failure likelihood as a function of injected 
stress levels, polarity, and rise time. This is an extension of a characterization 
methodology developed previously [7][8]. Eight failure modes across four severity levels 
are identified for the DUT. This information is then used to create a circuit model that 
outputs failure likelihood for the applied stress.  
Section 2 of the paper contains DUT pin characterization setup, procedure, and 
the results. Section 3 describes pin modeling methodology and SF modeling 
methodology. Section 4 proposes a SEED-like simulation procedure for soft failures. 






2. CHARACTERIZATION METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS 
2.1. AUTOMATED SETUP DESCRIPTION 
 The goal of this setup is to characterize an I/O pin of an active device in terms of 
soft failure modes and thresholds under direct stress injection. This is achieved by 
running a series of automated stress tests, varying stress parameters and then statistically 
processing the resulting data. 
 
 
Figure 1. System diagram of the chracterization setup. The control PC interfaces with the 
TLP measurement system over GPIB and COM, controls a MCU via serial, and 
interfaces with DUT by SSH over LAN. 
 
Most devices of the setup are controlled by a computer via several common 




standard TLP measurement system [16] is used to apply repeatable stress to the DUT pin 
and measure voltage and current transient waveforms. 
A detailed description of the process algorithm and the system is given in [7]. For 
cohesion, a summary is provided below. The DUT is an Intel Joule system. It consists of 
two parts: a “compute module” (SoC, WiFi, eMMC) and an “expansion board” (interface 
fanout, PDN, ESD protection, filtering, etc.). The two boards plug in through a 100-pin 
HRS surface-mount SF40 interconnect.  
The TLP pulses are injected into the active (i.e. “hot”) USB3 Gen1 interface 
SuperSpeed data lines of the DUT, without significant loading of the USB3 Gen 1 signal. 
This is achieved by using a low-capacitance TVS diode soldered at the point where TLP 
output connects to the data pin [11].  
The injection point is located on the directional current injection (DCI) board. The 
structure allows to direct the bulk of the current into the host (DUT in this case), while 
protecting the other end – the client. 
2.2. DIRECTIONAL CURRENT INJECTION BOARD 
For purposes of soft failure characterization, it is important to achieve two things: 
1) clarity of which side of the high-speed link fails, and 2) activity on the interface.  
Normally, when a stress pulse is injected into a DUT, the current spreads in both 
directions from the entry point. Due to the complexity of a typical system, it is difficult to 
establish whether the host failed, or the client. Moreover, if the host is the DUT, different 
clients may introduce unwanted vendor-to-vendor variation. Thus, directional current 




directionality of the DUT current, but requires careful design and works for links with < 1 
GHz bandwidth. For USB3 Gen 1 and higher or HDMI links or any other simplex high-
speed data protocols, a new concept is proposed.  
The concept as applied to USB3 Gen 1 Type A is illustrated in Figure 2. An 
isolation structure placed in series with the signal path. The directionality is facilitated by 
a flat-gain amplifier MMIC. Before and after the amplifier, resistive attenuators are 
placed. The system is designed so that total gain is ~0 dB in the relevant frequency range 
for the target technology. In case the channel loss is not sufficiently flat for high-speed 
links, an equalizer can be added to the structure. This complicates the design, but may be 
necessary for data rates above 5 GBPS.  
In terms of the signal propagating along the differential pair, the structure is 
almost transparent. The stress injected at the output side of the isolation structure is split: 
most of the current propagates towards the victim pin, while a small part is absorbed by 
the attenuator and the amplifier output terminal.  
Figure 3 contains the measurements performed on the test structure with a 100 ns 
TLP, in order to establish the effectiveness of the proposed concept. The results show that 
DUT is subjected to 90% of the total current from the TLP. 10% is absorbed by the 
isolation structure, while only several mA are seen at the protected (ADUT) side. 
Typically, the soft failure tests are only performed up to a few amperes to avoid 
hard fails. The amplifier must be selected appropriately and stress pulse bounds should be 





Figure 2. Isolation concept for directional current injection (DCI). The reverse direction 




Figure 3. Current directionality when injecting at the DCI board. 90% of the current 
propagates towards the DUT. The protected side is isolated by the reverse direction of the 





2.3. CHARACTERIZATION PROCESS AND OUTCOME 
Typical characterization process starts by powering the system, calibrating TLP 
test system and establishing an active link. Then, a characterization loop proceeds to 
sweep injected stress levels and polarity. For each injection, the following major steps are 
taken:  
1. Reset the DUT to nominal state; 
2. Inject stress into the target pin; 
3. Measure transient current and voltage waveforms; 
4. Diagnose the SF mode based on the kernel logs; 
5. Log the data and proceed to the next stress level; 
More intricate details of the process are described in [7], [8]. 
After pulse length and polarity sweep concludes, the data is processed and 
grouped. The soft failures are grouped and categorized by two traits: visibility and 
whether any action is needed in order to resolve the error.  
Table 1 contains the summary and examples of soft failures and categories 
observed in the process of USB3 host characterization. 
The failure probability depending on the injection level is illustrated in Figure 4 
for an USB3 SuperSpeed RX positive pin. The characterization results show that both for 
positive and negative stress injections, there is a sharp threshold after which failure rate is 
total of 100%, as shown by the dashed green curve. The victim is more prone to failure 
for negative polarity stress, as compared to positive. Failure modes for positive are split 
between three main ones: 1) USB3 client re-enumerates within the host operating system 




operating system, the failure is fixed by re-plugging the client, cat. C; and 3) latch-up at 
one of the power domains that presents as persistent power drain, requires total power 
cycle to fix, failure cat. D. The latch-up is detected by using an on-die power monitor [8].  
Negative polarity pulses cause similar soft failures, but with higher severity. 
These include: 1) USB3 re-enumerations; 2) USB3 client disappears from the host, but 
requires a system software reboot to fix (bringing power down not required); 3) USB 
interface falls back to USB2 mode, requires software reboot; 4) USB3 client disappears 
from the host and requires at least a full power cycle in order to fix the soft failure. The 
latter failure mode is one of the more severe ones, as it requires bringing the power of the 
whole system down. In embedded systems that means taking out the battery, or flipping a 
hardware switch which is often either inconvenient or inaccessible in consumer 
electronics. 
After device characterization and establishing SF modes and thresholds, this data 
is used to create a circuit model and optimize the design to improve device robustness to 
soft failure. The robustness improvement is quantified as increase in threshold values. 
 
Table 1. Soft failure categories. 
Cat. Visible Action Example for USB 
A ✘ ✘ Bit errors; packets getting resent 
B ✔ ✘ Drop in data throughput; re-enumerated by the host 
C ✔ ✔ 
Stop of data transfer; re-plugging of the cable or power 
cycling required 
D ✘ ✔ 
Device re-enumerates, but latch-up is unnoticed and 






Figure 4. SF characterization results for SSRX_P pinfor 100 ns. The interface is more 
susceptible to negative stress, as indicated by the low 100% failure threshold, as 
compared to the positive half of the plot. 
 
3. MODELING METHODOLOGY 
3.1. VICTIM PIN QUASI-STATIC IV MODEL 
The model of the victim pin is a standard 3-parameter diode to VDD and a diode 
to VSS that is based on measured quasi-static IV curve. The measurement consists of 
sweeping magnitude of 100 ns TLP pulse with trise=0.6 ns, then averaging 70-90% 
window of transient voltage and current waveforms. This model describes pin behavior 
for long stress pulses. Figure 5 shows good agreement between the model and the 
measurement above 0.3 A of the injected current. This is acceptable, because no failures 
occur at low levels of stress. When testing the DUT pin in order to create a diode model 
for soft failure analysis, one should limit the injection range to well below the levels of 
current and voltage that cause permanent damage (hard failure). A reasonably safe upper 




damage immediately, or cause latent damage of the DUT due to the stress repetition for 
hundreds of times. 
 
 
Figure 5. Model of the victim pin SSRX_P compared to the measured quasi-static IV 
curve. The characteristic remains the same whether the DUT is powered or not. 
3.2. PIN SOFT FAILURE MODEL 
The SF characterization determines the stress current threshold of different soft 
failures. To use this information in a SEED simulation two paths are possible. The SEED 
simulation can calculate and output the victim current, then in a post processing step it 
can be determined whether a soft failure occurs. A circuit-based alternative allows to 
obtain instant results, thereby removing the requirement of additional data post 
processing. For instant results during the SEED simulation, a circuit is designed that 




The concept of soft failure model lies in essentially measuring the average current 
Iavg injected into the victim, then comparing it against the thresholds obtained in the 
process of pin characterization. Average current is obtained as follows: 









    (1) 
 Figure 6 describes the SF pin symbol and the circuit that combines the I-V diode 
model and the SF model for the USB3 re-enumeration soft failure mode.  
Part 1) of the SF detector has the Current Controlled Current Source as an ideal 
current probe. The two ideal diodes determine the stress current path for different stress 
polarities.  
Part 2) of the circuit is a charge detector that measures total charge Qtotal injected 
into the victim pin.  
Part 3) contains the circuit that detects whether the Iavg current threshold 
(specified by the pin symbol parameter) has been exceeded and the value probability of 
the SF. The DC voltage source outputs signal proportional to the failure likelihood as 
observed during the characterization process. The voltage-controlled switch isolates the 
output pin from the DC source. 
The potential at the terminal of the charge detector’s capacitor is used as control 
voltage Vctrl of the switch. Figure 7 illustrates how the potential tracks the integral of 
injected stress current. As the Vctrl reaches the threshold value, the switch shorts, thus 
bringing the output pin potential to the value of SF likelihood. The detector circuit and 
the SF output circuits are duplicated for each soft failure mode. All SF output pin fail 
levels are summed to provide the total probability that any failure would occur. Ptotal is 





Figure 6. Circuit model of the SF detector and output. 
 
 
Figure 7. Charge detector of the SF Pin model output. The current is integrated and then 





This SF model provides the failure probability directly during the simulation run 
and a post-processing is not required. This accelerated the process of design optimization 
as described in Section 4. 
 
4. SOFT FAILURE SEED CONCEPT AND IMPLEMENTATION 
 
System-Efficient ESD Design has been discussed [4] [6], but it has not yet been 
applied to soft failures. The methodology consists in essence of the following steps: 
1. Pin characterization with TLP 
2. Pin-specific modeling 
3. Simulation of stress waveforms 
First, the target interface is experimentally characterized on reference hardware, 
then a corresponding measurement-based physical and SF-pin models are developed. The 
viability of SEED methodology is explored in relation to soft failures of USB3 Gen 1 
SSRX_P pin. Several mitigation schemes are tested experimentally to evaluate their 
effectiveness. 
Figure 8 provides schematic overview of the interface model. TLP is modeled as 
pulse voltage source. The interconnect discontinuity and PCB traces are modeled based 
on TDR measurements. The victim pin is represented as a diode, as described in 
Section 3. Several external mitigation techniques are applied to the pin and the SF 






Figure 8. System model for the SSRX_P pin including several elements of the PCB, the 
USB connector and protection devices. 
 
5. MITIGATION TECHNIQUES: RESISTORS AND TVS DIODES 
 
Several external mitigation techniques are tested in this work, experimentally and 
within numerical models: 
• An external current-limiting series resistor 
• A current-diverting TVS diode to signal reference 
• A combination of a series resistor and a TVS diode 
Several values of series resistors are tested and compared, but standalone resistors 
are never used as a mitigation technique. Often, they are combined with a TVS diode 
placed between the protection diode and the victim. In terms of the stress, this means that 
there is a higher higher impedance towards the victim and the current is diverted to the 
TVS diode instead. In terms of voltage, it helps to raise the node potential at the diode 
terminal, which turns on the diode at lower current stress levels. 
As a part of this investigation, several TVS diodes were first evaluated in terms of 
their quasi-static I-V characteristics. In the next step dynamic models were built to 




used [13] [15]. The main idea is to divert the stress current away from the victim. The 
diode static characteristics are compared to the victim pin in Figure 9. Here, several I-V 
curves are compared against each other in terms of turn on voltage and dynamic 
resistance. The external diode that turns on at lower voltage than the victim’s on-chip 
protection diodes (red curve) will provide stronger protection. In current situation, TVS1 
turns on faster than the victim’s on-chip protection and has much lower dynamic 
resistance. This is expected to improve the robustness of the pin. TVS2 turns on at a 
much higher voltage and therefore is not a viable protection option if used standalone. 
Two additional configurations are explored with TVS2 diode, where series resistors of 
R=5 Ω and R=10 Ω are placed between the victim and the diode. Experimental results 
and a qualitative model are presented in the following section. 
 
 





6. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
6.1. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
For each of the evaluated mitigation techniques, the DUT “expansion board” is 
modified, then tested for soft failure likelihood. The shift in the threshold is the criterium 
that quantifies an improvement of the interface pin robustness. “No protection” case is 
taken as a reference. All other configurations are tested with 100 ns and 2 ns TLP. The 
former is commonly used to represent a whole IEC discharge pulse directly into the pin. 
The short 1-2 ns pulses represent the stress coupled indirectly. 
Figure 10 shows 100 ns TLP results and the improvement of SF robustness of 
USB3 interface SSRX_P pin. For the long pulses, adding a series resistor shows about 
+20 V improvement in SF threshold. Placing one TVS2 diode has no significant effect, 
while TVS1 diode improves the robustness by about +50 V. In order to achieve more 
effective results, TVS2 is combined with a series resistor (cases “TVS2 + 5 Ω” and 
“TVS2 + 10 Ω”). Both these cases show at least 150 V shift in SF threshold of Ptotal. 
There is a background rate of ~20% SF rate at lower stress levels. This can be explained 
if the DUT has multiple failure modes that manifest the same way, but have different root 
causes. Thus, only a part of the SF (~80%) have reduced, while ~20% have not been 
mitigated by the protection scheme. 
Figure 11 is for 2 ns TLP and shows results for the protection schemes. Placing a 
series 5 Ω resistor gives only a marginal difference of +10-20 V. Placing one TVS2 diode 
improves the result for 2 ns pulses by +200 V. TVS2 + 5 Ω scheme also improves the 




improvement is observed for TVS1 device, it snaps back at much lower voltage 
(Vt1 = 5 V) and has low dynamic resistance. No soft failures were observed for this case 
until 430 V stress pulse (~ 4 A). Higher cases were not tested to avoid damage to the 
interface.  
It is shown that soft failures can be mitigated to some degree with the same 
devices typically used in hard failure prevention. The next step lies in creating a 
numerical circuit model that would allow design optimization procedure similar to well-
established hard failure SEED. 
 
Table 2. Summary of 100% soft failure thresholds in model vs measurement in terms of 
TLP charge voltage. 
Configuration 
100 ns TLP  
Threshold 
2 ns TLP 
Threshold 
Model Meas. Model Meas. 
No Protection 90 V 90 V 230 V 230 V 
5Ω in series +10 V +20 V +20 V +10 V 
TVS1 snapback +320 V +50 V +420 V >+160 V* 
TVS2 9v turn-on +0 V +0 V +160 V >+160 V* 
TVS2 + 5 Ω +130 V >+150 V* +170 V >+160 V* 







Figure 10. Measured overall SF threshold shift due to external protection placement, 
results for positive 100 ns TLP. 
 
 
Figure 11. Measured overall SF threshold shift due to external protection placement, 
results for positive 2 ns TLP. 
6.2. QUANTITATIVE CIRCUIT MODEL RESULTS 
Simulations are performed for protection schemes tested in the experiment. The 




in Table 2,  which shows that the proposed model generally predicts the change in SF 
threshold in cases of a standalone resistor or TVS2 diode for 100 ns pulses. In case of 
TVS1 snapback diode, the model overestimates the improvement, while for cases of 
TVS2 + 5 Ω and TVS2 + 10 Ω the observed threshold improvement was at least +150 V, 
but the tests were not pushed higher, for the risk of DUT damage. For 2 ns pulses the 
model also either predicts the change, or shows qualitative improvement. 
The model provides results for two pulse lengths: 100 ns and 2 ns. The values of 
Iavg (100 ns) and Iavg (2 ns) were measured during the characterization and are used as the 
threshold value in the simulation. The model outputs change in threshold of overall 
failure likelihood Ptotal. 
 
 
Figure 12. Left: shift in SF threshold as the series resistor limits current into the victim 
pin. Resistor value swept 0-15 Ω, simulation result. Right: current entering the victim 
pin, reduced as the resistance increases. 
 
Adding a series resistor in order to limit the current flowing into the victim pin 
yields marginal improvements. Figure 12 shows the voltage output of P_total output 




voltage (right). This result closely correlates to the observations: SF threshold shift is 
proportional to the resistor value.  
The case with TVS diodes varies from device to device and requires careful 
consideration of diode characteristics. The main purpose of the TVS devices is to clamp 
voltage on the pin and divert current. The outcome depends on both the diode choice and 
the victim characteristics. 
In the case of TVS1, a diode with low trigger voltage Vt1, +320 V improvement 
is predicted by the model, as illustrated in Figure 13. The left side shows the shift in the 
SF threshold, the right side – current split between the victim DUT and the TVS diode. 
At ~50 V, it is observed that the snapback occurs and TVS1 goes into low-impedance 
mode, thus diverting vast majority of current away from the victim. This qualitatively 
matches the measurement, but overestimates the observed +50V shift in the 
measurement. This can be explained, in part, if some failure modes are caused by the 
peak stress current, instead of the average current.  
TVS2 has higher turn-on voltage Vbr = 9 V, while the victim turns on @ Vbr = 
1.5 V. This means that the diode will not have much effect on the current until much 
higher stress levels. Figure 14 (right) shows comparison between total current injected by 
TLP and victim pin current. The effect of the TVS2 diode, as expected, is small. Thus, 
the SF threshold is not affected by this device, as shown in Figure 14 (left) and confirmed 
by the measurement.  
However, a possible way to improve the performance of a diode such as TVS2 is 
to combine it with 5Ω resistor series with the signal path. When combined – the victim 




the diode turns on at lower stress levels and efficiently diverts the current away from the 
victim, improving robustness by at least +130 V.  
 
 
Figure 13. Simulation result using TVS1 as external protection. Left: the shift of SF 
threshold vs TLP voltage. Right: currents vs TLP voltage. The snapback is evident by the 
knee and sharp drop in the victim current. 
 
 
Figure 14. Simulation result using TVS2 as external protection. Left: no shift of SF 
threshold vs TLP voltage. Right: currents vs TLP voltage. This TVS diode turns on at 







Figure 15. Simulation result using TVS2 and a resistor as external protection shows shifts 
of SF threshold vs TLP voltage. 
 
 
Figure 16. Simulation result using TVS2 and a resistor as external protection shows 
currents vs TLP voltage. With added resistance, the victim’s impedance rises, thus, TVS2 
turns on at lower TLP voltage and diverts current more effectively. Left: shows DUT 
current reduction because of adding the resistor; right: shows TVS current increase. The 
total injected current is given as a reference. 
 
The shift in threshold is shown Figure 15 for R = 5 Ω and R =10 Ω values. The 




only until +150V, to avoid damage to the DUT interface. The resulting DUT current 
reduction and TVS current increase are shown in the Figure 16. The impedance 
combination effect is illustrated in Figure 17. The intersections of the TVS2 diode with 
the other curves is where the diode becomes the dominant sink for the stress current. 
 
 
Figure 17. IV characteristic of combined victim and a series resistor. The intersection 
points with TVS2 chracteristic is where the diode becomes dominant and diverts the 




Based on this example that a soft fail SEED concept can be applied in a 
meaningful way to pre hardware design optimization, multiple directions of methodology 




• A full system-level simulation can be performed for an IEC test to the system to 
extract the actual energy coupling into the victim pin indirectly. 
• As the power delivery network can have a strong influence on certain soft 
failure types [3], the methodology can be expanded to account for the PDN. 
• The method isn’t limited to diodes and resistors. Common mode chokes (CMC) 
are also known to improve ESD robustness against hard fails, especially when used 
together with a TVS device [17]-[20]. SF SEED can help to investigate whether CMC 




For the first time, it has been demonstrated that conventional ESD hard failure 
protection techniques can also be used to improve the system level ESD soft failure 
robustness for direct pin injection This is achieved by diverting most of the ESD-induced 
current away from the victim pin. This does not avoid bit-errors, but it prevents current 
injection into VSS, VDD or the substrate of the victim IC which can lead to errors that 
cannot be corrected by the protocol of the I/O. A well selected TVS clamps the voltage at 
the IC close to the signal levels, such that only a small amount of current will be forced 
by the ESD into the IC.  
The reduction of the SF likelihood is investigated in a SEED-like simulation. This 
requires SEED models that include the soft failure behavior. 2 ns and 100 ns TLP are 




The simulation of a large signal circuit model of the victim pin, comprising a 
virtual detector circuit and the SF threshold dependency, show a good match to the 
physical system. The proposed version of the system model is circuit-based; however, the 
same methodology can be applied in co-simulation with 3D full-wave solvers. 
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II. PIN SPECIFIC ESD SOFT FAILURE CHARACTERIZATION USING A 
FULLY AUTOMATED SET-UP 
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ABSTRACT 
A fully automated system is developed for the systematic characterization of soft 
failure robustness for a DUT. The methodology is founded on software-based detection 
methods and applied to a USB3 interface. The approach is extendable to other interfaces 




In order to mitigate ESD-induced soft failures (SF) of a system, its robustness 
must first be evaluated. In light of the various parameters that influence the response of 
the system, it is best to use an automated characterization process. The outcome helps 
system-level and IC designers, and firmware developers.  
The world of soft failures is diverse and has been studied in [1]-[8]. In this work, 
the device under test (DUT) is an Intel Joule 570x Internet of Things (IoT) platform. The 
USB3.0 interface was selected for characterization. USB3 related SFs were studied in [7]. 
Several disturbance methods were evaluated: system-level IEC, magnetic loop probe, 




stress parameters: the pulse rise time didn’t seem to affect the failure threshold, while 
pulse width was found to be inverse proportional to it. The authors found no correlation 
between CPU stress and failure modes, but no other DUT load was explored. 
Furthermore, the root-cause analysis of more severe modes were performed and a 
strategy for SF-SEED was proposed.  This work confirms some of the earlier findings 
and extends others. The main idea is to develop a software-based method for an 
automated and systematic pin-specific characterization, and to explore methods for such 
data processing that can extract useful information.  
The automated system is able to provide quantitative information on the 
dependence of different failure thresholds on the injected pulse level, polarity, rise time, 
system load and state, pin-to-pin variation, etc. Eight failure types across four severity 
levels were identified for the given system and failure dependence on various system 
loads was established. 
 
2. CHARACTERIZATION PROCESS 
 
The TLP injection system by ESDEMC [9] was used to deliver repeatable pulses 
to the DUT. The TLP system combined with an oscilloscope allowed the injected 
currents and consequential voltages to be measured. The TLP was controlled through 
GPIB and COM interfaces to the “Control PC”, as shown in Figure 1. 
Additional in-house software on the “Control PC” handled: 
• The detection and recognition of failure modes, 




• Controlling the DUT over secure shell (SSH) protocol through the 
network (either through cable - LAN, or  WiFi - WLAN), and 
• Controlling other peripheral hardware (MCU). 
A microcontroller unit (MCU), controlled over a serial interface, was used to 
switch two power relays: one for power cycling the DUT, another for tripping the power 
of the USB3 client device plugged into the host DUT port (interface under test). 
 
 
Figure 1. Overall system diagram. 
2.1. SET-UP DESCRIPTION 
2.1.1. Measurement Set-up. The Intel Joule system consists of two separate parts 
– an expansion board and a compute module, as shown in Figure 2. The compute module 
contains all the key ICs (CPU, RAM, eMMC, Bluetooth, WiFi, etc.), while the expansion 
board provides power and fan-out to various interfaces (HDMI, microSD, USB3, USB-C, 




expansion board through a 100-pin HiRose (HRS) surface-mount SF40 interconnect. In 
order to isolate the effects of the IC itself, rather than the effect of external ESD 
protection, an interposer board was developed. It was placed between the expansion 
board and the compute module, allowing injection of TLP pulses into the running (i.e., 
“hot”) USB3 interface data lines of the DUT, without significant loading of the USB3 
signals. This was achieved by using low-capacitance TVS diodes, an injection technique 
developed in [8]. The circuit is shown in Figure 3 and the board is shown in Figure 4. 
In the current work, three pulse lengths were used in the robustness evaluation: 
100 ns, 6 ns, and 2 ns. The injection and measurement setup for the 100 ns pulse is 
presented in Figure 5. Figure 6 shows the setup for the 6 ns and 2 ns injections. 
The DUT and the peripheral hardware layout are depicted in Figure 7. The USB3 
client device was a USB3.0 SanDisk memory stick. It is reasonable to expect that client-
to-client variation will be minimal if TLP injection directionality is sufficiently high (i.e. 
the largest portion of the stress is injected towards the DUT, while the plugged in client 
experiences minimal stress). 
 
 
Figure 2. Left – expansion board with nothing pugged in; Right – compute module 





Figure 3. Injection and measurement circuit on the interposer board. 
 
 
Figure 4. Populated interposer board photo, top view. 
 
For the 100 ns injected pulse width, a current probe and deconvolution code was 
used to capture the injected current; for short pulses, a pick-off T combined with a delay 









Figure 6. Injection and measurement setup diagram for 6 ns and 2 ns pulses (vf-TLP 
method). 
 
2.1.2. Test Procedure for One Pulse. After calibrating the TLP injection and 
measurement system, the characterization procedure starts. For each injection level the 




1. Set the desired TLP voltage level; 
2. Confirm that the DUT is in the “nominal” state (i.e. idle running and reporting); 
3. Confirm that the interface under test is in the “nominal” state; 
4. Inject a TLP pulse into the target pin; 
5. Measure the waveforms and extract quasi-static voltage and current points; 
6. Acquire kernel logs from the DUT; 
7. Check if logs contain error messages; 
8. Check if the interface under test is still in the “nominal” state; 
9. If any abnormality is detected, classify and log the signature; 
10. Detect soft failure mode; 
11. Reset the interface to the nominal state (re-plug and check interface state); 
12. If needed, reset the system to the nominal state; 
13. Repeat for the next pulse level. 
 
 




Each of the listed steps contains several sub-steps which complicate the process. 
The full algorithm is discussed in the subsequent sections. 
2.2. AUTOMATION ALGORITHM 
The algorithm flow is almost fully depicted in Figure 8. The whole automated 
characterization process is run mostly from the “Control PC” by two separate software 
programs, along with an additional software program running on the DUT. One is the 
TLP software, and another is an in-house Python script. Voltage level, polarity, number 
of pulses, and number of injections for each level are set in the TLP graphical user 
interface. The TLP GUI also controls each injection and measurement, calibration, and 
current deconvolution. Upon a successful TLP injection, the GUI reports measured data 
to the Python script via an interface ASCII file, and proceeds to wait until the next 
injection is initiated. A “successful TLP injection” means that the current and voltage 
waveforms were measured without oscilloscope clipping and triggering problems. If 
clipping occurs, the TLP has to fire again in order for the scope to retrigger. This may 
cause system upsets without a proper V-I measurement. However, this happens only 
when the system transitions to a new stress injection level. Since each pulse is repeated 
~100 times, sufficient information is collected to measure enough points for a quasi-static 
IV curve. 
Upon receiving the data from the TLP software, the Python script pulls the kernel 
logs from the DUT via the SSH interface. The DUT runs Ubuntu GNU/Linux operating 
system, so by running the dmesg command [15] and filtering for USB-related events with 





Figure 8. DUT SF characterization algorithm flow. 
 
Some difficulty in the algorthm arises in three areas: 
1. Bringing the DUT and the interface under test into the “nominal” state at every 
pulse; 
2. Making sure that connections to the DUT and peripheral hardware are correctly 
opened and closed. 
3. Differentiating between certain failure types based on the recovery method 
when the log message is unclear (e.g., failures that have similar signatures, but one 




These complications are caused by the SF and often manifest in the following 
ways: 
• a disrupted connection to the DUT;  
• causing a lost connection to the DUT due to a reboot;  
• a need to reboot or power cycle the DUT to overcome the failure; 
• a SF occurs, but no kernel message appears in the logs; the USB client 
device must be replugged to re-establish connection and re-evaluate the state of the DUT 
USB interface.  
Obscurity of kernel messages can cause the algorithm to branch out and spend 
time “Detecting Soft Failure Type”, as depicted in Figure 9. The detection is rather 
simple: for each failure mode, there is a condition that needs to be satisfied. In the overall 
structure, there is a hierarchy of conditions that stack up from less severe to most severe. 
The left brach detects USB2 fallback-related failures, the right one detects USB3-related 
ones. 
Because SF behavior varies somewhat randomly, each test is performed up to 100 
times. The data points (TLP voltage, injected current, voltage, polarity, state of the 
system, SF type) from each test are recorded in a *.csv file and later processed by a 
Python script using Pandas (code library used for big data analysis) [13]. The multi-
dimensional data analysis is aided by constructing pivot charts grouped by the desired 
characteristic (e.g., injected current, pulse width, rise time, etc.) and calculating how 






Figure 9. SF type detection algorithm. 
 
3. RESULTS 
3.1. ESD GUN TESTING 
The Intel Joule development system was mounted inside an enclosure and a series 
of ESD gun tests were carried out. The purpose of the tests is to establish the range of 




USB3 port, and b) DUT chassis. An ESD Gun, Noiseken ESS-2000 TC-815R, was used 
to inject impulses in the range between 1 kV and 9kV, in contact discharge mode. The 
DUT and the injection points are shown in Figure 10. Each injection was repeated 100 
times, while the operator monitored and logged occurring soft failures. Discharging into 
the DUT chassis (point 1 in Figure 10) was relatively robust, causing the HDMI screen to 
flicker several times at higher discharge voltages, but having no reported USB failures. 
Screen flicker is a kind of SF within the system, but unrelated to the USB3 interface, so it 
is not discussed in detail. 
The results of the ESD gun testing for system-level stress injected into the USB3 
shield are shown in the Figure 11.  Most of the soft failures are  related to the HDMI 
screen (flickering, tinting with colors, screen turning off until HDMI cable replug). USB3 
soft failures occur after 6kV, with a likelihood of <5% and varied severity: from re-
enumeration of the device, to losing the connection and having to reboot the system. The 
logged failures correspond to the ones detected as a result of the automated 
characterization system, as discussed in detail in the subsequent sections. 
 
 





Figure 11. Results from ESD gun injection into the shield of USB3 interface of Joule 
expansion board. 
3.2. SOFT FAILURE CLASSIFICATION 
Observed soft failures can be categorized sufficiently well by Table 1 from [7], 
repeated here as Table 1.  Category “A” is the least severe – the user does not notice the 
effect of failure and no intervention is required on their side. Category “B” is noticeable, 
but the system recovers without intervention (data transfer speed drops, the system 
reconnects to the client device, etc.). Category “C” is most severe and encompasses a 
varied family of failures, which may require as little as re-plugging the client device and 
as much as completely power cycling the DUT. 
The failure modes observed for the DUT mostly fall in the most severe category 





Table 1. Categories of soft failures as per [7]. 
Cat. Definition Example for USB 
A 
Operator does not notice, no 
operator intervention 
Bit errors; 
packets getting resent 
B 
Operator notices, no operator 
intervention 
Drop in data throughput; 
connection re-established by the host 
C 
Operator notices, intervention 
required 
Stop of data transfer; 
re-plugging of the cable or 
power cycling required 
 
 
Table 2. Observed failure modes. 
Mode Observation Cat. 
1 Drop in the data rate; no operator action required B 
2.1 
Client device re-enumerated in USB3 mode; 
functionality restored by the system 
B 
2.2 
Client device re-enumerated in USB3 mode, a GUI pop-
up message occurs 




Client device falls back to USB2 mode; 
3.1 functionality restored by re-plugging the device 
3.2 functionality restored by rebooting the DUT 
3.3 functionality restored by power cycling 
C 
4 
Client device disappears; 
4.1 Functionality restored by re-plugging the device  
4.2 Functionality restored by rebooting the DUT  
4.3 Functionality restored by power cycling  
C 
5 
Wi-Fi functionality is lost; 






The most common SF is “USB3 re-enumeration” (Mode 2), which means that the 
DUT has re-established the connection with the client device without user intervention; in 
this case, USB3 functionality is preserved and no further action is required. Sometimes 
this failure mode is accompanied by a GUI error message which requires user interaction, 
making this variation a Category C failure. The next failure mode variation is “fallback to 
USB2” (Mode 3). It occurs as a result of negative current injection and requires user 
intervention. The milder case requires a mere re-plugging of the client device; a more 
serious case requires system reboot or power cycling. These take much longer than a re-
plug: 60-90 seconds to reboot vs 5 seconds to re-plug, which may be a major 
inconvenience to the operator. In case of positive high-current injections, a rare failure 
occurs that disables the USB interface and requires re-plugging, rebooting or power 
cycling (Mode 4). Occasionally, Wi-Fi functionality is lost (Mode 5), but no correlation 
between injection level and its occurrence has been established. 
The worst case for modern hand-held and wearable devices is the soft failure that 
requires physically disconnecting the power. For portable devices that would mean taking 
out and re-placing the battery or flipping a physical switch. Neither of these are an option 
for different design and policy reasons (waterproofing, warranty, security, etc.). This 
makes the requirements for such failures to be more stringent than less severe failure 
modes. 
3.3. VARIATION OF PULSE LENGTH 
The results for the Sandisk USB client for 2, 6, and 100 ns pulse width stresses 




+170 V. The assymetry is explained by the high risk of hard failure if the negative stress 
is pushed to higher levels (at least for long-pulse case). The vertical axis is the likelihood 
of soft failure occurrence in percent; i.e., how often a particular SF has occurred out of all 
injected pulses for each particular pulse level and width. The horizontal axis is the TLP 
charge voltage. As expected, at lower injection levels, no failures occur. For all cases, 
there seems to be a threshold, beyond which SF probability jumps from 0% to a 
substantial amount (between 50% and 80%). For lower duration pulses, this threshold is 
higher due to lower amount of energy delivered into the system. 
There seems to be little to no occurrence of serious soft failures for positive 
injections across the board. For positive current injections, only USB3 re-enumeration 
errors were observed. This is consistent across DUTs and other configurations.  Only one 
case for the 100 ns injection had a somewhat severe fail – fallback to USB2, requiring the 
client to be re-plugged. 
 
 





Figure 13. SF probability occurrence for 6 ns, against the TLP charge voltage. 
 
 
Figure 14. SF probability occurrence for 100 ns, against the TLP charge voltage. 
 
Negative current injections have a lower threshold and a richer variety of severe 




to 53% from 0% at -50V TLP injection for 100 ns disturbance. However, the most 
interesting observation is that enumeration errors fall in frequency (to <10%) as other 
failure modes become prevalent – such as USB2 fallback requiring a reboot (~60%) or 
USB2 fallback  requiring a power cycle (<5%), or USB3 connection loss, requiring a 
replug (also <5%). 
This may indicate that some other sub-system is failing more severely than the 
one which leads to the USB enumeration failure. These tests were completed within 
several days and consist of over 15,000 data points. The results seem consistent with [8], 
in so far as exhibiting the inversely proportional relationship between the pulse width and 
the failure threshold. In this case, the novel information is that negative current injections 
cause far more severe failures and that shorter pulses seem to cause less varied and less 
severe failures for the same injection levels. The rise time dependence is not explored, as 
there is firm evidence [7] that the correlation is weak. 
3.4. VARIATION OF DUT SYSTEM STATE 
One of the parameters of interest is soft failure occurrence under different system 
load conditions. There is prior evidence that the CPU load doesn’t have a significant 
influence on the likelihood of failure [7]. In this work, additional load conditions are 
explored by using a package stress-ng [14]. The package fully loads a 4-core CPU by 
using FFT function, reading and writing to RAM and eMMC. This load increases noise 
within the system, causing it to draw ~2x higher current and increasing overall system 
temperature. Hence, there is reasonable expectation that soft failures become more 




Ideally, one would repeat the full parametric sweep for each load condition. That 
increases characterization time many fold and is largely unnecessary, as baseline tests 
already show that no failures occur at lower injection levels. Therefore, in the interest of 
time conservation, only the threshold region for the positive injection sweep is selected 
for characterization under various load conditions. The results are shown in Figure 15.  
The failure threshold stress current is the same for all cases and the occurrence 
levels vary between approximately 50% and 80%. Marginal variation from load to load is 
observed (within 10%). This confirms that the CPU load has only a weak influence on 
soft failure occurrence. RAM and eMMC loading shows similar results. 
 
 
Figure 15. SF occurrence threshold due to positive injections under various system load 
states; 6 ns injected stress. 
 
It must be noted that the DUT load condition sweep was not automated in this 




“Set DUT State” in Figure 8, the operator defines several Linux command-line interface 
commands to be swept (one for each test condition) and one overarching loop is added 




The scope of this work is in automating the characterization flow and in 
expanding the knowledge about soft failure occurrence in complex systems. The root 
cause of specific soft failures is still being actively researched [3-6]. Specifically, with 
USB3 [7] [8] it has been found that more severe failures (fallback to USB2, etc.) occur 
due to power domain disturbances, while errors in data transmission are overwhelmingly 
consistent with lower-level pulses, where stress waveforms increase the signal peak-to-
peak voltage.  
One can draw practical conclusions from the obtained characterization data. From 
the expected ESD levels and the coupling paths, the designer can estimate the safe 
current waveforms and levels. These can be compared to the failure probability data from 
the IC characterization. 
The system developer may establish a probability threshold for each failure mode 
and use the method for a “pass/fail” evaluation. Depending on the product purpose, 20% 
failure rate may be acceptable for SF not requiring operator intervention, while <1% may 





If soft failures are grouped, an envelope may be used to check the satisfaction of 
the passing criteria, e.g. “Max Envelope” on Figures 12-14. 
A drawback of continuous, extensive TLP testing (especially with longer pulses) 
is the risk of “wearing out” the interface under test. This means introducing latent 
hardware failures by applying numerous pulses that under normal circumstances would 
not cause physical harm to the DUT. 
Once the DUT is well characterized, the system designer can use that information 
to “get it right the first time” and/or reduce the number of product development iterations: 
1. Make system design changes to mitigate some SF (system-, circuit-, and IC-
level). This is especially beneficial in the early design stages of a product, when a 
designer is able to introduce additional protection, filtering, shielding, etc. 
2. Make firmware or software improvements that would reduce severity or 
frequency of specific failure modes.  
In cases that require inclusion of a measurement-based method (e.g. spike in 
current consumption of the interface) [4] [11] [12], at first it should be tested 
independently to establish the reliability and efficacy of the measurement method. Once 
the clear detection criteria are established, a function within “Detect SF Type” in Figure 9 
can check if the criterion for detecting the SF has been satisfied. 
In order to adapt this characterization method to a different interface, at first 
exploratory work must be done to establish the variety of soft failure modes. Then 
hardware and software efforts are carried out. In terms of hardware – auxiliary boards 
may need to be designed to facilitate re-plugging, power cycling the interface of interest, 




functions inquire and establish whether the criteria for SF detection have been met. In 
addition, interface initialization functions may require change. The rest of the algorithm 




An automated system for SF robustness characterization was developed and 
applied to a USB3 interface of an existing development platform for a number of stress 
pulse lengths and system load conditions. Test results were processed and soft failure 
occurrence likelihood statistics were obtained for various levels of TLP injections, and 
both polarities. In the scope of this work, software-based detection methods were utilized, 
but the methodology is extendable to other interfaces and measurement-based failure 
detection methods as well.  
The methodology has a wide application range, but is possibly most useful for 
high-reliability systems that could not tolerate soft failures. One of the directions for 
further research is a deeper investigation into SF occurrence depending on system states 
(CPU load, GPU load, etc.) and a wider range of disturbances. Characterization and data 
processing methods are well established and may be extended for further study. 
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III. LATCH-UP DETECTION DURING ESD SOFT 
FAILURE CHARACTERIZATION USING AN ON-DIE POWER SENSOR 
Giorgi Maghlakelidze 
Deparment of Eletrical and Computer Engineering, Missouri University of Science and 
Technology, Rolla, MO 65409 
ABSTRACT 
ESD-induced latch up is detected with an on-die energy counter circuit. Raw 
values are accessed through a Linux operating system kernel call, then the power 
consumption is calculated. Persistent power consumption increase indicates the latch-up 
occurrence, thus avoiding the need of external equipment for its detection. The failure 
mode is not visually noticeable and requires full power cycling to fully recover. 
Keywords: soft failure, electrostatic discharge, latch-up, USB3, kernel logs, Linux, on-




ESD-induced soft failures (SF) are temporary upsets in a functional system [1][2]. 
These upsets vary in severity between a minor inconvenience to more impactful problems 
like data loss, loss of functionality, or battery drain. Thus, in order to ensure system 
reliability, maximized soft failure robustness should be one of the goals during product 
development. The phenomenon is characterized on system [3] and pin-level [4] using 




The current work extends previously developed software-based automated system 
to include latch-up detection via on-die sensors. This failure mode has been investigated 
in [2][5] and requires external equipment, such as a thermocouple or a thermal imaging 
camera. These methods rely on detecting heat dissipated by the latch-up current, which is 
an external manifestation of the phenomenon and takes time to manifest. In addition, this 
effect may not be detectable by heat if the DUT is equipped with an active cooling 
system (e.g. a fan). The proposed method solves the requirement of external equipment 
needed to detect a latch-up.  
 Soft failure robustness thresholds are investigated for USB3 Gen 1 interface of 
Intel Joule Internet of Things platform. Pulse-length and polarity dependence, pulse rise 
time, CPU loading effects, temperature, and other parameters are studied in [7][3]-[9]. 
The results are quantitative, statistics that show the probability of SF occurrence based on 
injected pulse characteristics. Twelve failure signatures are observed and categorized into 
6 failure modes. A deep root-cause analysis is not performed, as the goal in the current 
work is to characterize a pin of a DUT as a “black box”.  
 
Table 1. Take-home messages. 
 
1) Many ESD-induced soft failures can be detected within software (driver level, 
operating system level); 
2) Some sub-systems (e.g. thermal & power control) can be co-opted for ESD 
characterization purposes 
3) Latch-ups of can be detected by using on-die power consumption sensors during 
system operation; 
4) Some latch-up failures cannot be resolved without full power cycle, which is a 





2. CHARACTERIZATION PROCESS DESCRIPTION 
 
Characterization setup consists of several active parts that are controlled by the 
Control PC. The setup is depicted as system diagram in Figure 1. The PC controls the 
HPPI Transmission Line Pulse (TLP) system [10] to inject 50ns pulses of various levels 
and polarity. Oscilloscope, 1 kΩ sense resistor and a current probe CT-2 facilitate voltage 
and current measurements at the stress injection point. The pulses are forced through an 
interposer designed to fit inside the DUT and provide access to USB3 nets – between the 
IC pin and the receptacle. The rest of the setup comprises an MCU that controls power 
relays for: a) system main 12 V supply – facilitates power cycling, and b) USB3 5V 
supply – to emulate re-plugging of the USB client device. 
 
 






The Control PC interfaces with the TLP and OSC through GPIB, communicates 
with MCU using COM and controls the DUT using SSH over WLAN. The latter can also 
be implemented through wired LAN (if the DUT has one available), or through using an 
USB-to-LAN adapter connected to an available USB port (independent of the USB3 
controller under test). The PC runs custom software that controls the whole automated 
process that comprises: pulse parameter sweeping, measurement, SF detection and 
rectification, producing a report. A more detailed description of the systematic 
characterization methodology for one pin is given in [4]. 
2.1. STRESS INJECTION WITH INTERPOSER 
Intel Joule IoT platform consists of two parts – an expansion board and a compute 
module, as illustrated in Figure 2. The latter contains ICs for the core functionality (CPU, 
RAM, GPIO, Wi-Fi, USB3, HDMI, eMMC, Bluetooth, etc.), while the expansion board 
provides power distribution network and fans out the interfaces (HDMI, microSD, USB3, 
USB-C, GPIO) and contains the external ESD protection devices. The part in the middle, 
the interposer, plugs in between the expansion board and the compute module. Using 
low-capacitance TVS diodes, TLP stress is injected directly into USB3 interface data nets 
[11].  
Part of the stress propagates towards the DUT and causes SF, the other part - 
towards the USB3 client (“ADUT”), as shown in Figure 3. It is assumed that SF are 






1. Low-value series resistor that limits the current injected towards ADUT; 




Figure 2. Joule System and the interposer board. 
 
 
Figure 3. Force and measurement circuit, Joule interposer board. 
2.2. AUTOMATION ALGORITHM 
The characterization algorithm flow is depicted in Figure 4. It is based on [4] and 





Figure 4. DUT SF characterization algorithm flow. 
 
The “Control PC” software controls the TLP, its calibration, current 
deconvolution, checks the state of the DUT and the USB3 interface. If the USB3 
interface and the DUT are in nominal condition, TLP firing is allowed. After a pulse is 
injected, information is gathered from the kernel logs by querying the DUT operating 
system, GNU/Linux, command dmesg [12]. Command grep filters out all the USB3-
relevant results. If any failure signatures are detected, the state of the USB interface is 
reset. When needed, in order to achieve nominal state, the USB3 client is re-plugged, OS 




Test information such as: TLP voltage, injected current, voltage, polarity, state of 
the system, SF type, are recorded in a *.csv file and processed using Pandas (function 
library for big data analysis) [13]. The multi-dimensional data is analyzed by making 
pivot charts, where data are grouped by the desired characteristic (e.g., injected current, 
pulse width, etc.) and calculating how often an SF type has occurred for each variation. 
Worst case failure rate is tracked over the whole parameter sweep, as well as a 
cumulative failure rate per 100 injections. 
2.3. LATCH-UP DETECTION  
In order to execute thermal control in the system, multiple on-die sensors are 
typically used in high-performance CPUs. In-built functionality of Joule CPU allows to 
measure energy for thermal management purposes. Run-time Average Power Limit 
(RAPL) automatically adjusts the processor power to maintain temperature targets. 
RAPL has “energy counter” that is accessed by the kernel and reports “energy spent by 
the processor in micro Joules” [14]. 
To measure time-average dissipated power, a first-order derivative approximation 




     (1) 
Energy spent at each moment in time can be found by accessing the counter 
register within the kernel. Within the Linux kernel, RAPL driver’s energy counter can be 
accessed every 1 second at: 




The specifics of the implementation and address will vary on other DUTs and the 
operating systems. 
The latch-up presents itself as a sharp increase in power consumption, which 
persists over time, even if there is no load on the system. This is observed by monitoring 
the power profile over time and comparing the ongoing consumption to an idle one. An 
example of power profile over time during normal operation is presented in Figure 5.  
When the system is idle and USB3 device plugged in, the consumption is about 
0.5 W, while during file transfer it goes up to 1 W and can spike to 2 or 2.5 W for a short 
time. During maximum CPU or RAM operational stress test, power consumption peaks at 
just below 5 W and 2.7 W respectively, as illustrated in Figure 6.  
 
 
Figure 5. Power consumption profile for normal operating conditions. 
 
Power profile shows constant drain after latch-up is triggered. Figure 7 shows 
baseline power consumption increase by 1 W because a latch-up was triggered 




power consumption by 0.2 W, indicating that the soft failure occurred not on the USB 
client, but on the DUT – USB host. It is found that the soft failure cannot be resolved 
without full power cycle of the system. 
 
Figure 6. Power consumption profile for CPU stress and RAM stress test. 
 
 
Figure 7. Power profile after latch-up occurs shows baseline power consumption increase 





3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
3.1. SOFT FAILURE CATEGORIZATION 
The SF observed in the DUT are varied and can be differentiated into 6 failure 
modes, see Table 1. Mode 1 is relatively harmless from the failure perspective. Mode 2 is 
“USB3 re-enumeration” and is the most common. Here, the DUT re-initializes the client 
device without user intervention; i.e. USB3 is functional and no other intervention is 
required. Mode 3 is “fallback to USB2”, which occurs most often when negative current 
is injected. It may require different levels of user involvement. The simplest case requires 
a re-plugging of the USB device. The more demanding SF require system reboot or 
power cycling and can take up to 90 seconds. Mode 4 happens rarely, at positive 
injections - the USB interface goes down and requires re-plugging, rebooting or power 
cycling (similar to Mode 3). Mode 5 is rare and it exhibits itself by loss of Wi-Fi 
functionality. Mode 6 can entail less severe SF being observed, but they are accompanied 
by a latch-up, which is not visually obvious to the system operator. USB interface is still 
functional, but significant power drain is persistent. 
The observations have been categorized in [4], repeated here as Table 2 and 
improved to include the latch-up types of the SF.  Category “A” is mostly harmless as the 
user does not notice the failure and no action is required. “B” is noticeable, but the 
system recovers by itself. “C” and “D” are most severe and include a wide family of 
failures. These require as little as re-plugging the client device, but could possibly require 




can be the worst for modern phones and wearable devices that have non-replaceable 
batteries and are sealed for waterproofing or other reasons. 
 
Table 2. Failure modes observed on the DUT. 
Mode Observation Cat. 
1 Drop in the data rate; no operator action required B 
2.1 
Client device re-enumerated in USB3 mode; 
functionality restored by the system 
B 
2.2 
Client device re-enumerated in USB3 mode, a GUI pop-up 
message occurs 




Client device falls back to USB2 mode; 
3.1 functionality restored by re-plugging the device 
3.2 functionality restored by rebooting the DUT 
3.3 functionality restored by power cycling 
C 
4 
Client device disappears; 
4.1 Functionality restored by re-plugging the device  
4.2 Functionality restored by rebooting the DUT  
4.3 Functionality restored by power cycling  
C 
5 
Wi-Fi functionality is lost; 




6.1 Device re-enumerates in USB3 mode 
6.2 Device disappears  
Latch-up resolved only by power cycling 
D 
 
“D” is the category for the latch-up type failures. They are unnoticed without 
special measurement equipment, so the user may be unaware of the additional power 
drain in their system. In case of battery-powered devices, this maybe of utmost 
importance, as any waste of energy significantly reduces system life and may degrade the 




Such complications would require the system design to have a higher degree of 
immunity to SF. This systematic characterization process is important to reliably test the 
system robustness. 
 




Example for USB 
A ✘ ✘ 
Bit errors; 
packets getting resent 
B ✔ ✘ 
Drop in data throughput; 
connection re-established by the host 
C ✔ ✔ 
Stop of data transfer; 
re-plugging of the cable or 
power cycling required 
D ✘ ✔ 
Device re-enumerates, but latch up is 
unnoticed 
 
3.2. INTERPRETATION OF CHARACTERIZATION RESULTS 
Two USB3 Gen 1 client devices were tested to establish client-to-client variation: 
1. Sandisk Ultra 16GB 
2. Transcend JetFlash 16GB 
The results seem to be similar between the two DUTs. The test conditions were as 
close to identical as possible: only the memory sticks were swapped between tests. Figure 
8 for a Transcend memory stick. On the horizontal axis is the TLP charge voltage. At 




increasing, to reach 100% cumulative failure rate at 110V. This is a sharp threshold, 
which corresponds to ~2A injected current. 
 
 
Figure 8. SF likelihood with Transcend JetFlash client for 50 ns TLP. 
 
For positive stress current the following SF are common: a) USB3 re-
enumeration, b) USB3 losing connection and requiring only a re-plug, and c) latch-up 
(consistently under 10% after 100 V). For negative injections, there is also a threshold for 
100% failure rate, but it corresponds to about -1 A. The SF modes include USB3 
enumeration, but are quickly dominated by USB3 losing connection and requiring a full 
power cycle (>90% failure rate). Negative stress seems to correlate to a richer variety and 
more serious SF modes: USB2 fall back, requiring restart and reboot, USB3 disappearing 
from the system, latch-up, etc. Further negative stress levels were not investigated, as 
there was a high chance of inducing hard failures (the DUT is far more susceptible to 
negative current, USB3 interface damaged at -2 A injection). 
Similar results are observed for Sandisk Ultra, the characterization outcome is 









An automated characterization provides useful information to a system designer 
in terms of SF failure thresholds, despite the DUT being considered as a “black box”. 
Cumulative failure rate curve can be effectively used against a pass-fail threshold. 
Several less severe failures modes can be excluded from the analysis, because they are 
auto-resolved by the interface protocol. A designer may try different methods (software 
or hardware) to mitigate the soft failure, e.g. as diverting stress current away from the 
victim, then characterize the pin again. System robustness is considered “improved” if the 
failure thresholds shift to higher stress levels. 
Addition of latch-up detection gives the possibility to detect 100% of failure rate 
without external equipment. This can be used not only during design and test phases, but 
after deployment of the product. One of the disadvantages of the proposed method is that 
the energy counter sensor must be implemented on the die and in software (drivers and 




power management system may not have an energy counter. In this case, one could 
attempt to use a temperature sensor as a slower and less accurate alternative. The main 
advantage is that the functionality is included with the thermal control subsystem and no 
additional measurement equipment is required. 
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2. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
In the first paper of this dissertation, it has been demonstrated for the first time, that 
conventional ESD hard failure protection techniques are effective against soft failures due 
to the direct pin injection. The improvement is achieved by diverting most of the ESD-
induced current away from the victim. Simple bit-errors cannot be avoided, but this 
technique prevents current injection into VSS, VDD or the substrate of the victim IC which 
can lead to failures that cannot be corrected by the protocol of the I/O. A well-selected TVS 
diode clamps the voltage at the pin close to the signal. As a result, the current forced by the 
ESD into the IC is strongly reduced.  
The reduction of the SF likelihood is investigated in a SEED-like simulation. This 
requires SEED models that include the soft failure behavior. 2 ns and 100 ns TLP are 
used to represent direct and indirect pulse injection. The simulation of a large signal 
circuit model of the victim pin, comprising a virtual detector circuit and the SF threshold 
dependency, show a good match to the physical system. The proposed version of the 
system model is circuit-based; however, the same methodology can be applied in co-
simulation with 3D full-wave solvers.  
The second paper provides a systematic approach for DUT characterization and 
data collection, which is used in the SF-SEED as basis of the empirical victim pin model. 
An automated setup and algorithm are presented and shown to be effective. Collected 




soft failure thresholds are extracted and used in the pin model. The results show that 
longer pulse lengths are associated with lower thresholds and more serious failure modes.  
The third paper has shown that there is an effective way to use system thermal 
control sensors in order to detect latch-ups without external equipment. This is done 
throught an on-die energy counter that measured energy spent by the CPU at discrete 
time intervals. This technique contributes to the characterization methodology by helping 
to detect non-visible, but persistent failures that require operator intervention.  
Combined, these publications show that soft failure SEED methodology is a 
viable way to characterize a system and strategize on improving soft failure robustness, 
quickly iterate on design changes and optimize for the highest ESD robustness. 
Additionally, it was shown for the first time, that several conventional hard failure ESD 
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